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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit last Friday vacated an injunction that allowed West Virginia defensive lineman Jimmori Robinson and three teammates to play for the Mountaineers in 2025. This signals that the U.S. Supreme Court is potentially one step closer to weighing in on whether the NCAA limiting athlete eligibility to four seasons of a sport in five years is a violation of antitrust law.
The ruling comes as Yahoo Sports reports on Wednesday that the NCAA is contemplating a change in eligibility rules so that athletes would have five years to compete from the time they turn 19 or when they graduate from high school—whichever is earlier. That potential rule change, just like any other NCAA eligibility rule, could be challenged as violating antitrust law since it would not be bargained with a players’ association.
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In the absence of collective bargaining, an eligibility rule can be depicted as problematic since the NCAA, as the controlling overseer of conferences and colleges, “buys” the services of college athletes. It’s also problematic because schools agreeing to restrict how long each could pay athletes means they are conspiring to limit how they compete for athletes, depriving those athletes of the fruits of the competition.
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling also follows decisions by U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and Seventh Circuit in similar cases, Diego Pavia v. NCAA and Nyzier Fourqurean v. NCAA, respectively. Since 2024, there have been more than 70 cases brought by relatively older athletes who wish to remain college eligible—and earn NIL and revenue-share money—after having played four seasons within five years.
The topic of eligibility was central to President Donald Trump’s executive order issued last Friday, in which Trump proposes that eligibility be capped to five years. While the order could face hurdles in being implemented, it highlights the sizable legal importance of NCAA eligibility in contemporary sports law.
Writing on behalf of himself and Fourth Circuit Judges Pamela Harris and DeAndrea Benjamin, Judge Henry Floyd found that Robinson’s case is flawed because it doesn’t establish a relevant market for antitrust analysis. In antitrust cases involving labor, including college football players, the relevant market generally means a pool of workers who have similar jobs or occupations in selling their unique services—such as playing football well enough to compete at a power conference school—to employers who are reasonably similar.
In August, U.S. District Judge John Preston Bailey granted a preliminary injunction to Robinson, 25, and a trio of his West Virginia teammates, who are also part of the case. The four started their collegiate journeys at junior colleges in 2018 or 2019, and the NCAA eligibility clock starts once an athlete enrolls full time in a collegiate institution, even a non-NCAA member school such as a two- or three-year junior college.
Bailey concluded that the players adequately identified the relevant market as the nationwide market for the labor of Division I football players. This is a market governed by NCAA rules and, by extension, the NCAA itself and its member institutions.
Floyd disagreed. He concluded the players failed to put forward reliable evidence of the relevant market and did not offer a “coherent theory” of anticompetitive effects in a market. He added that “recent changes” to the market, including the House settlement permitting colleges to directly pay athletes, raise the need for figuring out the relevant market since that market appears to be changing.
Floyd was left with “critical questions” that need to be answered with “cold, hard data” at the trial court level before the litigation can continue:
Floyd also warned that judges tasked with presiding over eligibility lawsuits face the unenviable task of assessing these complicated economic questions without much data to go by and with rules and trends changing in college sports management.
Floyd also reasoned that the case shouldn’t be regarded as moot, even though the players have exhausted their NCAA eligibility. He wrote that it is “likely” they “will return to court seeking similar injunctive relief for the 2026-27 college football season.” Floyd also pointed out that the topic of college football players trying to keep playing after exhausting their eligibility “likely falls within the category of cases that are capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
Although Floyd sided with the NCAA, he didn’t agree with the association that eligibility rules are exempt from antitrust scrutiny. The NCAA has argued, sometimes successfully, that how long a student-athlete can play is not a commercial or business matter subject to antitrust law. Instead, the NCAA says eligibility is about educational advancement, namely how long a student can play a sport given that college students usually spend four or five years in school before they go on to some other pursuit in life. Such a topic is not governed by antitrust law, which concerns commercial activities.
Floyd reasoned eligibility rules in the context of college football are subject to antitrust scrutiny since they limit athletes’ participation in a labor market.
“This restraint on labor through association rulemaking,” Floyd explained, “interferes with student-athletes’ free exercise of their rights to engage in commerce (i.e., participate in Division I football).”
To be clear, the vulnerability of eligibility rules to antitrust scrutiny doesn’t mean those rules won’t withstand such scrutiny. As Floyd noted, the applicable method of evaluation is rule of reason, which weighs the pro- and anti-competitive effects of a rule. This is a standard that often benefits defendants.
While a rule limiting play to five years deprives more seasoned athletes of the chance to keep playing and earn more NIL/revenue-share money, it also ensures that college football doesn’t devolve into an inferior version of the NFL where players don’t leave, don’t hold roster spots that would go to incoming freshmen or transfer students and have less and less in common with classmates.
Don’t be surprised if the U.S. Supreme Court at some point takes up this topic. Decisions like in Robinsonv. NCAA make that more likely.
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The ruling comes as Yahoo Sports reports on Wednesday that the NCAA is contemplating a change in eligibility rules so that athletes would have five years to compete from the time they turn 19 or when they graduate from high school—whichever is earlier. That potential rule change, just like any other NCAA eligibility rule, could be challenged as violating antitrust law since it would not be bargained with a players’ association.
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In the absence of collective bargaining, an eligibility rule can be depicted as problematic since the NCAA, as the controlling overseer of conferences and colleges, “buys” the services of college athletes. It’s also problematic because schools agreeing to restrict how long each could pay athletes means they are conspiring to limit how they compete for athletes, depriving those athletes of the fruits of the competition.
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling also follows decisions by U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and Seventh Circuit in similar cases, Diego Pavia v. NCAA and Nyzier Fourqurean v. NCAA, respectively. Since 2024, there have been more than 70 cases brought by relatively older athletes who wish to remain college eligible—and earn NIL and revenue-share money—after having played four seasons within five years.
The topic of eligibility was central to President Donald Trump’s executive order issued last Friday, in which Trump proposes that eligibility be capped to five years. While the order could face hurdles in being implemented, it highlights the sizable legal importance of NCAA eligibility in contemporary sports law.
Writing on behalf of himself and Fourth Circuit Judges Pamela Harris and DeAndrea Benjamin, Judge Henry Floyd found that Robinson’s case is flawed because it doesn’t establish a relevant market for antitrust analysis. In antitrust cases involving labor, including college football players, the relevant market generally means a pool of workers who have similar jobs or occupations in selling their unique services—such as playing football well enough to compete at a power conference school—to employers who are reasonably similar.
In August, U.S. District Judge John Preston Bailey granted a preliminary injunction to Robinson, 25, and a trio of his West Virginia teammates, who are also part of the case. The four started their collegiate journeys at junior colleges in 2018 or 2019, and the NCAA eligibility clock starts once an athlete enrolls full time in a collegiate institution, even a non-NCAA member school such as a two- or three-year junior college.
Bailey concluded that the players adequately identified the relevant market as the nationwide market for the labor of Division I football players. This is a market governed by NCAA rules and, by extension, the NCAA itself and its member institutions.
Floyd disagreed. He concluded the players failed to put forward reliable evidence of the relevant market and did not offer a “coherent theory” of anticompetitive effects in a market. He added that “recent changes” to the market, including the House settlement permitting colleges to directly pay athletes, raise the need for figuring out the relevant market since that market appears to be changing.
Floyd was left with “critical questions” that need to be answered with “cold, hard data” at the trial court level before the litigation can continue:
- Is the correct market definition that of all college football (i.e., including NCAA Division I, II, and III as well as junior colleges [JUCOs]) or is it just NCAA Division I?
- Are players from Division II and III schools reasonable substitutes, such that these schools should be part of the market definition?
- What about JUCOs?
- Are any athletes choosing JUCOs over Division I schools and, if not, is it because of the JUCO Rule?
- How does the availability of revenue sharing change the market’s recruitment?
- How does foreclosing experienced former JUCO players from their would-be third and fourth years of NCAA competition affect the Division I football labor market?
- Do NCAA Division I football teams compete with NFL teams for players post-Alston?
Floyd also warned that judges tasked with presiding over eligibility lawsuits face the unenviable task of assessing these complicated economic questions without much data to go by and with rules and trends changing in college sports management.
Floyd also reasoned that the case shouldn’t be regarded as moot, even though the players have exhausted their NCAA eligibility. He wrote that it is “likely” they “will return to court seeking similar injunctive relief for the 2026-27 college football season.” Floyd also pointed out that the topic of college football players trying to keep playing after exhausting their eligibility “likely falls within the category of cases that are capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
Although Floyd sided with the NCAA, he didn’t agree with the association that eligibility rules are exempt from antitrust scrutiny. The NCAA has argued, sometimes successfully, that how long a student-athlete can play is not a commercial or business matter subject to antitrust law. Instead, the NCAA says eligibility is about educational advancement, namely how long a student can play a sport given that college students usually spend four or five years in school before they go on to some other pursuit in life. Such a topic is not governed by antitrust law, which concerns commercial activities.
Floyd reasoned eligibility rules in the context of college football are subject to antitrust scrutiny since they limit athletes’ participation in a labor market.
“This restraint on labor through association rulemaking,” Floyd explained, “interferes with student-athletes’ free exercise of their rights to engage in commerce (i.e., participate in Division I football).”
To be clear, the vulnerability of eligibility rules to antitrust scrutiny doesn’t mean those rules won’t withstand such scrutiny. As Floyd noted, the applicable method of evaluation is rule of reason, which weighs the pro- and anti-competitive effects of a rule. This is a standard that often benefits defendants.
While a rule limiting play to five years deprives more seasoned athletes of the chance to keep playing and earn more NIL/revenue-share money, it also ensures that college football doesn’t devolve into an inferior version of the NFL where players don’t leave, don’t hold roster spots that would go to incoming freshmen or transfer students and have less and less in common with classmates.
Don’t be surprised if the U.S. Supreme Court at some point takes up this topic. Decisions like in Robinsonv. NCAA make that more likely.
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Continue reading...
