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LIV Golf, which has lost financial backing from Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, recently announced that it is restructuring its operations and seeking to raise $300 million in fresh capital. The PIF has contributed more than $5 billion since the league’s inception in 2022 and announced that it is ceasing funding at the end of this season. Scott O’Neil, who took over as LIV CEO in January 2025, is looking to show potential investors that what’s being called LIV 2.0 has a new strategy and a path to be profitable.
Yet the nascent league faces a conundrum unlike other entities forced into restructuring: Its most valuable asset—player contracts—is also its most costly liability. So says several financial and legal experts in the investment, business-restructuring and bankruptcy sectors that Golf Digest contacted to learn more about the challenge LIV Golf has as it fights for its future.
When it comes to restructuring a company, our experts noted that potential investors will be looking at the assets to assess whether the business has something to build a viable plan around for the future, and then try to shed the liabilities that are holding it back.
LIV’s reported contracts with top players are worth staggering amounts: Jon Rahm for $300 million; Bryson DeChambeau and Dustin Johnson at $125 million each. Then there is Phil Mickelson, 56, who has played just one event this year due to family reasons and has a $200 million contract. (Golf Digest also reported that Mickelson has been accused of inappropriate contact with a female course employee at The Farms in San Diego and that he is no longer a member of the club.) There are also a host of aging players—Lee Westwood, Ian Poulter, Graeme McDowell, Richard Bland—with contracts in the tens of millions that are believed to expire at the end of this season and who will need to resign or be replaced to fill out team rosters.
A restructuring isn’t going to be great for the players either: Their contracts are with LIV. They’re not guaranteed by the PIF if LIV goes under. So, if LIV ceases to exist, there is no money to pay the players’ contracts.
Working together to attract new investors, according to our experts, is in both sides’ interest because if they don’t restructure in such a way that makes LIV attractive to new investors then LIV goes away, like the USFL did in its challenge to the NFL in the 1980s. In that case, players don’t get what’s owed them, and they have to try to find a tour to play on, which will be harder for some than others.
That said, LIV’s top players could use their large contracts as leverage to get better terms for their teams, which are set up to be stand-alone entities like other sports franchises. The top players would take a hit on the guaranteed money to keep everything going with the hope that equity in one of the 13 teams would be worth something at a future date.
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What needs to be decided is what LIV could offer those players so they forgo money owed to them while also making the team ownerships appealing to investors. And that would give LIV’s collection of younger, lower-paid players, such as recent NCAA champion Michael LaSasso and U.S. Amateur champion Josele Ballester, a chance to take over from players who would otherwise be on the PGA Tour Champions.
What’s likely to happen between now and September, when LIV’s season concludes and the PIF money officially dries up? Our experts contend that at this point, it’s as binary as a three-foot putt in the club championship: You make it and win; you miss it and go away.
Scenario 1: LIV gets the money
LIV officials are hoping to have the investment in place by Sept. 1. The goal is $300 million, though they say the league could sustain with $250 million. With this new investment, O’Neil has said they can be profitable in three years. (For context, the amount they’re looking to raise to achieve profitability is a quarter of what the PIF was spending annually for the past five years.)
In the investment deck, LIV said it is looking to raise that money from ultra-high-net-worth individuals, private equity funds, family offices, strategic partners and media and sports and entertainment companies—in other words, investors who are comfortable locking up their money in an illiquid investment with the expectation that it grows exponentially by a future date.
A source with knowledge of LIV Golf and its investment process said they see a path to the money being raised by the working deadline and are confident that the process is on track. The season ends in September so not having the money would cast even more doubt on LIV’s future—if not put it in default on its player contracts.
“We've begun sharing our business plan with prospective partners who recognize the opportunity in team golf on a global scale,” O’Neil said in a statement. “At its core, the plan expands on the foundation we've established: team golf, elite competition and a commitment to grow the game globally while introducing a disciplined path to profitability and long-term franchise value. Our players have been central to shaping this vision, and the plan gives them a direct stake in the league's success.”
LIV Golf CEO Scott O'Neil during day four of LIV Golf Andalucia in June.
Octavio Passos
The investor deck for LIV 2.0 gives rights back to players and gives them equity in the teams in place of their guaranteed contracts. For example, it said: “most individual commercial rights will be returned to players, giving them greater control over their brands, partnerships, and future earnings potential.”
The deck also noted: “LIV 2.0 is centered on player ownership, equity participation and long-term value creation—giving players a direct stake in the league's success.”
Of course, to get anyone to put up eight or nine figures to bankroll LIV, they’re going to need to feel assured the league has enough fans interested in watching to make it worth investing in. TV ratings in the U.S. have been well behind PGA Tour broadcasts. But LIV 2.0 is relying on internal data it has collected measuring both TV and online viewership in every country as well as individual U.S. states to show the size and scale of the current fanbase worldwide and how they have a viable product moving forward. Events in Australia and South Africa, for instance, have seen tens of thousands of fans in attendance. And a LIV official said the league had viewership of 5.2 million people for their event in Australia.
Another interesting hook in the deck to entice investors is highlighting LIV’s net-operating loss (NOL) carryforwards. Usually, a company wouldn’t be boasting that it burned through billions of dollars, but in this case, it could be a selling point. “In addition to strong business momentum, world-class athletes and a right-sized cost structure, the League carries significant NOL carryforwards, which we believe represents meaningful incremental value creation for potential investors to drive outsized returns.”
What this means in English is LIV has lost so much money that it could minimize future taxes on gains from a new equity investment. In the U.S., NOLs are capped at 80 percent of an investment; in the U.K., where LIV is also based, 100 percent of NOLs can be included. Getting access to those losses as a new investor could provide tax benefits so significant that investors might not pay capital gains taxes on their new investment for years, if ever.
A source with knowledge of LIV Golf and its investment process said: "The overwhelming interest in LIV is being driven by the fundamentals: the global platform, team golf, the commercial momentum over the past year, and expectations for disciplined operations. The NOL carryforwards are an added tailwind, materially improving the after-tax economics and helping accelerate conversations with prospective investors.”
What makes the operating losses interesting as part of a deal is LIV doesn’t have a lot of other assets beyond player contracts. It has a deal for half of its tournaments to be aired on Fox Sports’ platforms—sometimes FS1 but they could also air on Fox Business or its app. What Fox is paying has been categorized as “modest” and hasn’t been disclosed—something that likely would be talked up if it were substantial.
If Bryson DeChambeau is willing to take equity in his LIV team, the Crushers, in a future contract rather than a big signing bonus, the league has a greater chance of getting new investment.
Octavio Passos
LIV also has a half-dozen named partners, including golf stalwarts Rolex and HSBC. But the bulk of the partners are companies based in Saudi Arabia and/or owned by the PIF, so it remains to be seen if they stick around.
For the full amount of those NOLs to be valuable, the deal has to be structured in such a way that the investment doesn’t trigger a change of ownership. If the ownership of LIV is changed, then the value of those NOLs drops to a much smaller amount each year, not their full value. But if the deal is structured so that the investment is what’s called a staged acquisition then those NOLs carryforward. The risk here is the investor won’t have control—and they have to wait three years actually to acquire the entity—in the next stage, as it were.
If a change of ownership provision is triggered, then the losses diminish. Still a $1 billion carry-forward loss would become about $38 million a year, by the current I.R.S. rate to calculate this. If all $5 billion that the PIF invested was indeed lost and there is zero profit, that NOL carryforward climbs to $188 million a year. Both are each year.
Mason Champion, a managing director and a member of the global sports and entertainment practice at Morgan Stanley Wealth Management who advises professional golfers across several tours, is optimistic. “If the players converted cash compensation to equity, and if it’s real, franchise-based team golf, it’s a different model,” he said. “It’s like Aaron Judge having ownership of the Yankees.”
That would be easier for players like Rahm and DeChambeau to weather given their wealth. It would be harder for younger players who didn’t get the headline-grabbing contracts.
“Some of the players are excited about it,” Champion said. “They’re talking about utilizing endorsement money as a primary source of cash flow and using that to reconcile what they might earn from their equity stakes. That puts a stronger emphasis on individual brands, which at the end of the day could be really good for the team brand.”
Scenario 2: LIV doesn’t get the money
If the investment money doesn’t come in, things become complicated, quickly. It could happen if LIV can’t find a way to incentivize its players with the largest contracts to accept equity stakes in their teams in lieu of payments. This goes back to the challenge of potential new investors wanting LIV’s assets (DeChambeau) but not its liabilities (his contract).
“When the CEO was out there talking, he said we’re fine, but they always say that,” said Joe Bain, a bankruptcy attorney at Jones Walker. “Based on prior restructuring deals I’ve done, [league officials are] using bankruptcy as leverage. It’s ‘work with us or we’ll put this into bankruptcy.’”
That’s something most companies and creditors want to avoid. When a Chapter 11 restructuring or a Chapter 7 liquidation filing is made, it freezes all claims. But the company also gets put into receivership, and a court appoints a trustee to address the outstanding claims. Control of the process is lost.
At that point, the players who might be contractually owed millions of dollars get thrown into a bucket with LIV’s other unsecured creditors. DJ and Cam Smith are evaluated the same as golf courses that host events, companies that set up the grandstands and hotdog vendors who didn’t get paid their fee. They all have to scrape out something in bankruptcy court.
Jon Rahm is under contract after 2026, but he has said he has not been part of any meetings with potential LIV investors.
WIKUS DE WET
In addition to being complicated and protracted, this process is also expensive. “One of the most powerful weapons in the U.S. in bankruptcy is the automatic stay,” Bain said, referring to the freezing of all claims.
If you’re owed money, the goal is for an individual or group of creditors to get a judgment validating your claim, he said. Trickier here. “But if you have a U.S. judgment and you’re showing it to a Saudi official, you’re not going to get far.”
In this case, it’s unlikely to be particularly fruitful. Unlike a company with physical assets—think a factory or a fleet of trucks—LIV has nothing of value it could sell to raise the money. Jon Rahm isn’t a premier league footballer whose contract could be sold to the PGA Tour. He’s a golfer who has a personal services contract with LIV, which in a forced restructuring would be worthless.
“Personally, my own opinion, I don’t think there’s anything to restructure here,” said J. Scott Victor, a managing director at SSG Capital Advisors, where he focuses on special situations. “This is an investment that’s not panned out.”
Bain pushed back against the idea that LIV teams have individual value at this point, like the New York Yankees or Dallas Cowboys. “You don’t have a collection of teams; you have players,” he said.
He contrasted LIV’s filing with the Texas Rangers’ 2010 bankruptcy, when the then-owners of the Major League Baseball team defaulted on more than $500 million in loans but still had the stadium, the TV rights, the season ticket holders and more.
“That was an individual team put into bankruptcy,” Bain said. “Here you’re talking about the league. The lack of TV rights is a real problem. That’s a huge revenue driver.”
James Katchadurian, a senior managing director and partner at CR3 Partners, a restructuring firm, concurred that if player contracts aren’t changed, LIV can’t get new investment.
“If this was a normal company, you’d say do they have a reason to exist?” he said. “You’d ask, ‘What’s the business model? Can they make money going forward?’ They have these tournaments with high-dollar amount prizes, and they’re trying to make golf exciting and faster. But there’s been all these headwinds. The PGA Tour was barring its players from participating.”
Katchadurian said he doesn’t see a strategy for LIV to survive that doesn’t involve players agreeing to substantially renegotiate their contracts, but the question is in exchange for what. Additionally, the prize money offered at tournaments would have to be significantly lower than the current $30 million per event.
While it looks like the PIF is ending its funding regardless, LIV would still have to be valued before anyone would invest. Sure, the PIF put in $5 billion, but Katchadurian said the value of LIV today could be less than $100 million, maybe as little as $10 million. So, on that basis the new investors could come in with $300 million and own the majority—if the PIF agreed to be diluted that drastically and publicly.
“You could say the valuation is $100 million,” he said, “but we’ll give you a 20 percent stake to save face.”
Another added wrinkle that Bain and Katchadurian pointed to is unless LIV’s headquarters get moved shortly from London to the United States, any restructuring would have to be recognized by the United Kingdom as well.
“The fact that we’re not in Chapter 7 right now means there is some negotiation going on with the players,” Bain said, referring to the tax code term for liquidating a company. “The fact that they’ve hired bankruptcy advisors suggests to me there’s some sort of conversation to negotiate value. But without renegotiation of contracts, it will become a Chapter 7 because without some sort of infusion, they’ll have no choice but to liquidate.”
Whether it’s Scenario 1 and LIV pulls through, or Scenario 2 and it does not, the golf league promises to continue to grab attention this summer as negotiations over its fate heat up with the September deadline.
Continue reading...
Yet the nascent league faces a conundrum unlike other entities forced into restructuring: Its most valuable asset—player contracts—is also its most costly liability. So says several financial and legal experts in the investment, business-restructuring and bankruptcy sectors that Golf Digest contacted to learn more about the challenge LIV Golf has as it fights for its future.
When it comes to restructuring a company, our experts noted that potential investors will be looking at the assets to assess whether the business has something to build a viable plan around for the future, and then try to shed the liabilities that are holding it back.
LIV’s reported contracts with top players are worth staggering amounts: Jon Rahm for $300 million; Bryson DeChambeau and Dustin Johnson at $125 million each. Then there is Phil Mickelson, 56, who has played just one event this year due to family reasons and has a $200 million contract. (Golf Digest also reported that Mickelson has been accused of inappropriate contact with a female course employee at The Farms in San Diego and that he is no longer a member of the club.) There are also a host of aging players—Lee Westwood, Ian Poulter, Graeme McDowell, Richard Bland—with contracts in the tens of millions that are believed to expire at the end of this season and who will need to resign or be replaced to fill out team rosters.
A restructuring isn’t going to be great for the players either: Their contracts are with LIV. They’re not guaranteed by the PIF if LIV goes under. So, if LIV ceases to exist, there is no money to pay the players’ contracts.
Working together to attract new investors, according to our experts, is in both sides’ interest because if they don’t restructure in such a way that makes LIV attractive to new investors then LIV goes away, like the USFL did in its challenge to the NFL in the 1980s. In that case, players don’t get what’s owed them, and they have to try to find a tour to play on, which will be harder for some than others.
That said, LIV’s top players could use their large contracts as leverage to get better terms for their teams, which are set up to be stand-alone entities like other sports franchises. The top players would take a hit on the guaranteed money to keep everything going with the hope that equity in one of the 13 teams would be worth something at a future date.
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Open Championship Phil Mickelson out of Open Championship, to miss all four majors for first time in professional career What needs to be decided is what LIV could offer those players so they forgo money owed to them while also making the team ownerships appealing to investors. And that would give LIV’s collection of younger, lower-paid players, such as recent NCAA champion Michael LaSasso and U.S. Amateur champion Josele Ballester, a chance to take over from players who would otherwise be on the PGA Tour Champions.
What’s likely to happen between now and September, when LIV’s season concludes and the PIF money officially dries up? Our experts contend that at this point, it’s as binary as a three-foot putt in the club championship: You make it and win; you miss it and go away.
Scenario 1: LIV gets the money
LIV officials are hoping to have the investment in place by Sept. 1. The goal is $300 million, though they say the league could sustain with $250 million. With this new investment, O’Neil has said they can be profitable in three years. (For context, the amount they’re looking to raise to achieve profitability is a quarter of what the PIF was spending annually for the past five years.)
In the investment deck, LIV said it is looking to raise that money from ultra-high-net-worth individuals, private equity funds, family offices, strategic partners and media and sports and entertainment companies—in other words, investors who are comfortable locking up their money in an illiquid investment with the expectation that it grows exponentially by a future date.
A source with knowledge of LIV Golf and its investment process said they see a path to the money being raised by the working deadline and are confident that the process is on track. The season ends in September so not having the money would cast even more doubt on LIV’s future—if not put it in default on its player contracts.
“We've begun sharing our business plan with prospective partners who recognize the opportunity in team golf on a global scale,” O’Neil said in a statement. “At its core, the plan expands on the foundation we've established: team golf, elite competition and a commitment to grow the game globally while introducing a disciplined path to profitability and long-term franchise value. Our players have been central to shaping this vision, and the plan gives them a direct stake in the league's success.”
You must be registered for see images attach
LIV Golf CEO Scott O'Neil during day four of LIV Golf Andalucia in June.
Octavio Passos
The investor deck for LIV 2.0 gives rights back to players and gives them equity in the teams in place of their guaranteed contracts. For example, it said: “most individual commercial rights will be returned to players, giving them greater control over their brands, partnerships, and future earnings potential.”
The deck also noted: “LIV 2.0 is centered on player ownership, equity participation and long-term value creation—giving players a direct stake in the league's success.”
Of course, to get anyone to put up eight or nine figures to bankroll LIV, they’re going to need to feel assured the league has enough fans interested in watching to make it worth investing in. TV ratings in the U.S. have been well behind PGA Tour broadcasts. But LIV 2.0 is relying on internal data it has collected measuring both TV and online viewership in every country as well as individual U.S. states to show the size and scale of the current fanbase worldwide and how they have a viable product moving forward. Events in Australia and South Africa, for instance, have seen tens of thousands of fans in attendance. And a LIV official said the league had viewership of 5.2 million people for their event in Australia.
Another interesting hook in the deck to entice investors is highlighting LIV’s net-operating loss (NOL) carryforwards. Usually, a company wouldn’t be boasting that it burned through billions of dollars, but in this case, it could be a selling point. “In addition to strong business momentum, world-class athletes and a right-sized cost structure, the League carries significant NOL carryforwards, which we believe represents meaningful incremental value creation for potential investors to drive outsized returns.”
What this means in English is LIV has lost so much money that it could minimize future taxes on gains from a new equity investment. In the U.S., NOLs are capped at 80 percent of an investment; in the U.K., where LIV is also based, 100 percent of NOLs can be included. Getting access to those losses as a new investor could provide tax benefits so significant that investors might not pay capital gains taxes on their new investment for years, if ever.
A source with knowledge of LIV Golf and its investment process said: "The overwhelming interest in LIV is being driven by the fundamentals: the global platform, team golf, the commercial momentum over the past year, and expectations for disciplined operations. The NOL carryforwards are an added tailwind, materially improving the after-tax economics and helping accelerate conversations with prospective investors.”
What makes the operating losses interesting as part of a deal is LIV doesn’t have a lot of other assets beyond player contracts. It has a deal for half of its tournaments to be aired on Fox Sports’ platforms—sometimes FS1 but they could also air on Fox Business or its app. What Fox is paying has been categorized as “modest” and hasn’t been disclosed—something that likely would be talked up if it were substantial.
You must be registered for see images attach
If Bryson DeChambeau is willing to take equity in his LIV team, the Crushers, in a future contract rather than a big signing bonus, the league has a greater chance of getting new investment.
Octavio Passos
LIV also has a half-dozen named partners, including golf stalwarts Rolex and HSBC. But the bulk of the partners are companies based in Saudi Arabia and/or owned by the PIF, so it remains to be seen if they stick around.
For the full amount of those NOLs to be valuable, the deal has to be structured in such a way that the investment doesn’t trigger a change of ownership. If the ownership of LIV is changed, then the value of those NOLs drops to a much smaller amount each year, not their full value. But if the deal is structured so that the investment is what’s called a staged acquisition then those NOLs carryforward. The risk here is the investor won’t have control—and they have to wait three years actually to acquire the entity—in the next stage, as it were.
If a change of ownership provision is triggered, then the losses diminish. Still a $1 billion carry-forward loss would become about $38 million a year, by the current I.R.S. rate to calculate this. If all $5 billion that the PIF invested was indeed lost and there is zero profit, that NOL carryforward climbs to $188 million a year. Both are each year.
Mason Champion, a managing director and a member of the global sports and entertainment practice at Morgan Stanley Wealth Management who advises professional golfers across several tours, is optimistic. “If the players converted cash compensation to equity, and if it’s real, franchise-based team golf, it’s a different model,” he said. “It’s like Aaron Judge having ownership of the Yankees.”
That would be easier for players like Rahm and DeChambeau to weather given their wealth. It would be harder for younger players who didn’t get the headline-grabbing contracts.
“Some of the players are excited about it,” Champion said. “They’re talking about utilizing endorsement money as a primary source of cash flow and using that to reconcile what they might earn from their equity stakes. That puts a stronger emphasis on individual brands, which at the end of the day could be really good for the team brand.”
Scenario 2: LIV doesn’t get the money
If the investment money doesn’t come in, things become complicated, quickly. It could happen if LIV can’t find a way to incentivize its players with the largest contracts to accept equity stakes in their teams in lieu of payments. This goes back to the challenge of potential new investors wanting LIV’s assets (DeChambeau) but not its liabilities (his contract).
“When the CEO was out there talking, he said we’re fine, but they always say that,” said Joe Bain, a bankruptcy attorney at Jones Walker. “Based on prior restructuring deals I’ve done, [league officials are] using bankruptcy as leverage. It’s ‘work with us or we’ll put this into bankruptcy.’”
That’s something most companies and creditors want to avoid. When a Chapter 11 restructuring or a Chapter 7 liquidation filing is made, it freezes all claims. But the company also gets put into receivership, and a court appoints a trustee to address the outstanding claims. Control of the process is lost.
At that point, the players who might be contractually owed millions of dollars get thrown into a bucket with LIV’s other unsecured creditors. DJ and Cam Smith are evaluated the same as golf courses that host events, companies that set up the grandstands and hotdog vendors who didn’t get paid their fee. They all have to scrape out something in bankruptcy court.
You must be registered for see images attach
Jon Rahm is under contract after 2026, but he has said he has not been part of any meetings with potential LIV investors.
WIKUS DE WET
In addition to being complicated and protracted, this process is also expensive. “One of the most powerful weapons in the U.S. in bankruptcy is the automatic stay,” Bain said, referring to the freezing of all claims.
If you’re owed money, the goal is for an individual or group of creditors to get a judgment validating your claim, he said. Trickier here. “But if you have a U.S. judgment and you’re showing it to a Saudi official, you’re not going to get far.”
In this case, it’s unlikely to be particularly fruitful. Unlike a company with physical assets—think a factory or a fleet of trucks—LIV has nothing of value it could sell to raise the money. Jon Rahm isn’t a premier league footballer whose contract could be sold to the PGA Tour. He’s a golfer who has a personal services contract with LIV, which in a forced restructuring would be worthless.
“Personally, my own opinion, I don’t think there’s anything to restructure here,” said J. Scott Victor, a managing director at SSG Capital Advisors, where he focuses on special situations. “This is an investment that’s not panned out.”
Bain pushed back against the idea that LIV teams have individual value at this point, like the New York Yankees or Dallas Cowboys. “You don’t have a collection of teams; you have players,” he said.
He contrasted LIV’s filing with the Texas Rangers’ 2010 bankruptcy, when the then-owners of the Major League Baseball team defaulted on more than $500 million in loans but still had the stadium, the TV rights, the season ticket holders and more.
“That was an individual team put into bankruptcy,” Bain said. “Here you’re talking about the league. The lack of TV rights is a real problem. That’s a huge revenue driver.”
James Katchadurian, a senior managing director and partner at CR3 Partners, a restructuring firm, concurred that if player contracts aren’t changed, LIV can’t get new investment.
“If this was a normal company, you’d say do they have a reason to exist?” he said. “You’d ask, ‘What’s the business model? Can they make money going forward?’ They have these tournaments with high-dollar amount prizes, and they’re trying to make golf exciting and faster. But there’s been all these headwinds. The PGA Tour was barring its players from participating.”
Katchadurian said he doesn’t see a strategy for LIV to survive that doesn’t involve players agreeing to substantially renegotiate their contracts, but the question is in exchange for what. Additionally, the prize money offered at tournaments would have to be significantly lower than the current $30 million per event.
While it looks like the PIF is ending its funding regardless, LIV would still have to be valued before anyone would invest. Sure, the PIF put in $5 billion, but Katchadurian said the value of LIV today could be less than $100 million, maybe as little as $10 million. So, on that basis the new investors could come in with $300 million and own the majority—if the PIF agreed to be diluted that drastically and publicly.
“You could say the valuation is $100 million,” he said, “but we’ll give you a 20 percent stake to save face.”
Another added wrinkle that Bain and Katchadurian pointed to is unless LIV’s headquarters get moved shortly from London to the United States, any restructuring would have to be recognized by the United Kingdom as well.
“The fact that we’re not in Chapter 7 right now means there is some negotiation going on with the players,” Bain said, referring to the tax code term for liquidating a company. “The fact that they’ve hired bankruptcy advisors suggests to me there’s some sort of conversation to negotiate value. But without renegotiation of contracts, it will become a Chapter 7 because without some sort of infusion, they’ll have no choice but to liquidate.”
Whether it’s Scenario 1 and LIV pulls through, or Scenario 2 and it does not, the golf league promises to continue to grab attention this summer as negotiations over its fate heat up with the September deadline.
Continue reading...
