40yearfan

raq: Al-Zarqawi -- The Sunnis Deliver?
June 08, 2006 14 51 GMT

Summary

Following the announcement of the death of al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab
al- Zarqawi in a targeted U.S. airstrike, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki announced that the three vacant security positions in the Iraqi
Cabinet have been filled and approved by the Parliament. By providing
precise intelligence on al-Zarqawi's location, it appears that Iraq's Sunni
political leadership has demonstrated the willingness to deliver on a
U.S.-brokered deal to solidify the political arrangement in Iraq.

Analysis

Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and several of his key aides
were killed at a safe-house outside Baqubah, Iraq, at 6:15 p.m. local time
June 8. U.S. military officials say there was absolutely no doubt of
al-Zarqawi's exact location when the strike was ordered.

The delivery of such precise intelligence was more than likely facilitated
by Iraq's Sunni political leadership. It is no coincidence that Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki presented the candidates for the ministers of
defense, interior and national security following the announcement of
al-Zarqawi's death. All three were approved by Parliament. The new defense
minister is Iraqi Army Gen. Abdul-Qadre Mohammed Jassim, a Sunni who is not
directly affiliated with any Sunni political party; Shia Jawad al-Bolani, an
independent member of the United Iraqi Alliance, and Sherwan al-Waili, a
member of Hizb al-Dawah, were approved for the interior and national
security ministries, respectively.

About seven hours passed between the time of the attack and al-Maliki's
announcement of the ministries. During those seven-odd hours, the Iraqi
government and U.S. officials were engaged in intense negotiations to
solidify a hung up political arrangement.

When the formation of the Iraqi government was announced May 20, Stratfor
declared that Iraq is at its break point. The security posts left vacant
represented the political bargaining chips for the Sunnis and Shia to
extract the key structural guarantees needed to form a government that would
be politically functional. Either the Sunni political leadership would
follow through in its pledge to quell insurgent violence, or the standing
political agreement would fall through.

The Sunnis would not begin to show the ability to withdraw the insurgent
card in the political talks until they had structural guarantees in place.
As time wore on, however, it became evident that the Sunnis had a pressing
need to demonstrate their ability to deliver on this deal. Though the steady
tempo of insurgent violence allowed the Sunnis leverage in the talks, it was
also raising questions about the influence of the Sunni political principals
among the insurgents.

Knowing that the jihadist insurgency led by al-Zarqawi cannot survive
without an active Sunni support network in the country, the Shia and
Americans would not give political guarantees to the Sunnis until they
clearly showed the ability and willingness to contain the insurgency. The
death of al-Zarqawi represents the first real concession delivered by the
Sunni political leadership to secure its political standing in the country.
His elimination also serves as a catalyst for developing the U.S. exit
strategy in Iraq.

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